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PLURALISM AND REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE 
SHARING ECONOMY  
Erez Aloni 
Abstract: Providers use platforms in dissimilar ways. Some providers 
create new capacity and designate it for exclusively commercial use via 
platforms. For example, a provider buys a car that serves predominantly for 
driving paying passengers, converts a standard residential rental to a short-
term rental, or works full-time via a platform. Conversely, other providers 
leverage their idle capacity and monetize it (e.g., a provider uses the family 
car to drive platform passengers in the evenings). This chapter argues that 
the distinction between new and idle capacity is a fundamental concept that 
should guide regulation of activities in the platform economy. Creating new 
capacity for platform use creates negative externalities that are likely to 
reduce choices for consumers and providers. Examples include reduction in 
the availability of traditional services (e.g., hotels, taxies), decline in 
availability of standard residential rentals, and cutbacks in protected 
employment opportunities. However, putting excess capacity to platform 
use produces lower negative externalities and can bring benefits: increasing 
the availability of flexible employment opportunities and expanding 
consumer market choice. The chapter deploys the theory of pluralism to 
support regulation that increases employee and consumer choices but also 
curbs harms attendant to the platforms and protects traditional services and 
institutions that are important to society.  
INTRODUCTION 
Not all activities in the platform economy are commensurate. Some 
nonprofessional providers perform activities infrequently and through 
increased excess capacity (that is, using their surplus goods, time, or 
skills). Conversely, specialized providers conduct other activities at a 
commercial pace by harnessing assets designated primarily for the 
exchanges. The first set of activities, which I call “work in increased use 
of excess capacity,” generates more valuable choice to consumers and 
workers and often produces fewer negative externalities. The latter type 
of activity sometimes results, or risks resulting, in reduced choice for 
workers and consumers and often leads to more negative externalities than 
 Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. 
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the first type. In this chapter I flesh out the differences between the two 
kinds of activity and argue that their dissimilarities warrant divergent 
regulatory responses.  
Recent scholarship advancing a theory of pluralism in private law helps 
to show why the different activities deserve dissimilar regulatory regimes. 
Consequently, I build on existing literature about pluralistic theory, and 
develop it further, enlisting its principles to guide the regulation of the 
platform economy. As I explain below, pluralism charges that the state 
support increased choice for individuals by facilitating alternative 
economic and social spheres that embody diverse values. Promoting 
choice, however, does not mean deregulation but, rather, requires that the 
state establish a set of different valuable alternatives that safeguard 
individuals from possible free-market harms. Because work grounded in 
increased use of excess capacity engenders more choice for consumers 
and workers, pluralistic principles suggest that the state should encourage 
these kinds of activities by tailoring regulation to the activities in this 
category. By the same token, because commercial activities that are not 
based in increased use of excess capacity yield more negative externalities 
including reduced choice, lawmakers should adopt more rigorous and 
protective set of regulations to restrain such harms.  
In what follows, I briefly canvass the origins, development, and 
principles of pluralistic theory. Next, I argue that we should distinguish 
between activities in the platform economy, based on where they fall on a 
spectrum of use of excess capacity. I submit that platform-generated 
activities that leverage increased use of excess capacity promote valuable 
choice, whereas activities that gravitate toward commercial work with 
little or no increased use of excess capacity can decrease it. Finally, I use 
pluralistic theory to underpin my suggestions for the regulation of 
economic activities facilitated by platforms.   
A note about terminology: naming the economic model at stake is a 
source of fierce and important debate and is not an issue of mere 
semantics. Because “sharing” is a misnomer, and “gig” economy 
describes only part of the activities that platforms facilitate (further, its 
use distracts attention from commercial activities that are a big part of 
such activities), I employ the more neutral term “platform economy.”1   
1 See Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 
1406–07 (2016) (critiquing the existing definitions of the platform economic).  
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMY-BASED 
PLURALISM   
The term “pluralism” has various meanings in legal academia and other 
academic disciplines. The version of pluralistic theory that I build on and 
develop here is an extension of various scholarly investigations. I refer 
particularly to “autonomy-based pluralism,” a theoretical approach that 
Hanoch Dagan explicated, primarily by relying on the seminal work of 
Joseph Raz on the connection between autonomy and pluralism.  
For Raz, personal autonomy (to distinguish from moral autonomy) is 
both instrumentally valuable and a constituent of well-being because it 
enables individuals to control, navigate, and create good lives. 
Alternatively, in Raz’s favorite metaphor, it enables them to be the authors 
of their own lives. Hence, the life of an autonomous person “is, in part, of 
his own making.”2 When individuals can shape their own lives, their self-
definition and self-realization become conceivable; this, in turn, means 
that they can maximize their potential.3 Raz proposes three conditions that 
are necessary to exercise such personal autonomy: first, an individual 
must have the mental and physical capabilities required to make rational 
choices and carry them out; second, individuals must be independent in 
their choices, which means they must be free from coercion and 
manipulation; third, an autonomous person must have an adequate range 
of choices from which to choose.4  
Most important to this account is the third condition. In order to lead 
an autonomous life, having a choice and the ability to exercise choice are 
not sufficient conditions for autonomy: an adequate range of choices is a 
requisite condition. To illustrate, a man trapped in a pit with enough food 
for survival has the capacity to exercise choice but not enough options to 
live an autonomous life.5 Raz states, “A person is autonomous only if he 
has a variety of acceptable options available to him to choose from, and 
his life became as it is through his choice of some of these options.”6 An 
“adequate range” does not mean the quantity but the variety of 
alternatives. Many choices of the commensurate thing do not satisfy this 
2 Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 204 (1986). 
3 Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in 
7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 202 (P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein eds. 
1982). 
4 Raz, supra note 2, at 373. 
5 Id. at 373-4.  
6 Id. at 204.  
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requirement.7  
  
Valuing autonomy in this sense, Raz maintains, requires adoption of 
moral pluralism, “the view that there are various forms and styles of life 
which exemplify different virtues and which are incompatible.”8 This 
view endorses the existence of various incompatible and valuable 
pursuits, relationships, and commitments that individuals can choose from 
as a means to exercise their autonomy. Razian pluralistic principles thus 
assume a meaningful range of worthwhile options as a precondition for 
autonomy. Worthwhile choices do not exist if a buyer can only choose 
from among a hundred similar houses; an adequate choice would be 
among a townhouse, an urban flat, and a suburban house.  
  
This conception of autonomy-based pluralism leads Raz to the final 
relevant observation: the state’s role is to enable conditions that allow 
people to be the authors of their own lives. Hence, to ensure adequacy of 
choice, it is not enough that the state be committed to noninterference; 
rather, it is obligated to “create conditions which enable [its] subjects to 
enjoy greater liberty than they otherwise would.”9    
 
Building on the Razian conceptions of autonomy and pluralism, 
Dagan’s recent work espouses pluralistic principles as the foundation for 
private-law theory.10 His primary contributions relevant to this account 
are twofold. First, Dagan employs pluralistic theories other than Raz’s to 
formulate his concepts, and he also deploys Raz’s “value pluralism” to 
support his theory of the state’s role in regulation.11 Value pluralism is 
predicated on the notion that because there exists a plurality of universal 
values, they cannot be ranked (incommensurable), and there is often 
conflict between them.12 For our purposes, and in a simplified version, the 
                                                     
7 Id. at 375.  
8 Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in JUSTIFYING 
TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 155, 159 (Susan Mendus ed., 
1988). 
9 Raz, supra note 2, at 18-19.  
10 See e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 
76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (2013).   
11 Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1409, 1412 (2012). 
12 GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 44–56 (2002) (defining 
value pluralism based on four elements: (1) universal values (2) plurality (3) 
incommensurability (4) in conflict); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (2002).  
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relevant point is that because the world is composed of plural and diverse 
universal values, human beings assign a variety of values to the same 
experiences.13 Second, Dagan imports Raz’s observations to the private-
law system, arguing that only a pluralistic approach can explain private-
law doctrines and institutions. No single value can or should undergird the 
private-law structure; only a variety of values, and the balance among 
them, can serve as a foundation to the entire system of private law.    
 
These two observations merge into one coherent theory concerning the 
state’s role in supporting private-law institutions. Accordingly, Dagan 
holds that pluralism is grounded in respect for diverse values, or different 
balances of values, and in the promotion of autonomy that can only be 
achieved by having adequate and meaningful choices.14 The role of 
pluralistic private law “is to offer a rich repertoire of forms of human 
interaction.”15 While the purpose of this structural pluralistic system is to 
foster autonomy, the structure incorporates various values beyond 
autonomy. Thus, Dagan asserts, the “law should facilitate (within limits) 
the coexistence of various social spheres embodying different modes of 
valuation.”16 At the same time, facilitating diverse legal options that 
embed various modes of valuation is not tantamount to embodying free-
market principles. As Dagan notes, “[F]acilitation is rarely exhausted by 
a hands-off policy and a corresponding hospitable attitude to freedom of 
contract. Rather, facilitation requires the law's active empowerment in 
providing institutional arrangements, including reliable guarantees 
against opportunistic behavior.”17 
 
Dagan’s insights are relevant beyond the scope of private law. They 
can and should serve as guidelines for regulating matters that traditionally 
fall under the rubric of public law, such as housing and transportation. The 
state’s duty, as defined by Raz, is not limited, as between private parties: 
it is the state’s role to assure the conditions for people to flourish.  
 
Let us now see how pluralistic theory helps to illuminate issues 
concerning the platform economy and to provide general guidelines for 
that economy’s regulation.   
 
                                                     
13 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779, 780 (1994).  
14 Dagan, supra note 11, at 1435.  
15 Id. at 1432.  
16 Id. at 1424.  
17 Id. at 1429. 
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II. THE SPECTRUM OF USE OF EXCESS CAPACITY 
The platform economy expands valuable choice when it enables more 
activities in use of excess capacity. By “excess capacity” I mean activities 
that exploit the surplus of people’s unused or underused time, skills, or 
assets to create “more capacity than the owner can herself use at once and 
that can thereby be monetized.”18  
 
Before I explain why one type of activity is choice-enhancing and the 
other is potentially choice-decreasing, one should understand the extent 
to which both activities—work in increased use of excess capacity and 
traditional work—are dominant in platform activity. That is, a key aspect 
of the platform economy, which we must take into consideration when 
discussing its regulations, is the distinction between exchanges based on 
leveraging surplus capacity and conventional exchanges that are not based 
on increased use of excess capacity. By failing to distinguish them, and 
by using terms such as “gig” or “sharing” economy, we blur the immense 
differences between these activities and qualify similar legal treatment for 
them. As stated, this is not merely semantics: platform firms often claim 
that their function is mainly to enable “gigs,” i.e., work through increased 
use of excess capacity. For example, in response to a court ruling that 
found a New York City short-term rental, facilitated by Airbnb, illegal,19 
Airbnb stated, “It is time to fix this law and protect hosts who occasionally 
rent out their own homes. Eighty-seven percent of Airbnb hosts in New 
York list just a home they live in—they are average New Yorkers trying 
to make ends meet, not illegal hotels that should be subject to the 2010 
law.”20 Airbnb’s supporters echo this idea by arguing that “[t]he services 
help provide lower-cost lodging to visitors, while allowing property 
owners to earn returns on underused assets.”21 Similarly, in court filings 
Uber stated that the firm “merely provides a platform for people who own 
vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with other 
                                                     
18 See Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 
929 (2017).   
19 See City of New York v. Carrey, Nos. 13006002 and 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl. 
Control Bd. May 9, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/142650911/Decision-and-
Order-for-NOV-35006622J. 
20 See Vacation Rental Site Airbnb Ruled Illegal in New York City, FOX NEWS 
(May 21, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2013/05/21/airbnb-illegal-in-new-york-
city.html. 
21 Andrew Moylan, RoomScore 2016: Short-Term Rental Regulation in U.S. 
Cities, R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 55 (Mar. 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.pdf, at 1. 
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people looking to pay for those skills and assets.”22 
 
Although a vast portion of the work that platforms enable comprises 
activities based on use of idle capacity, a large segment of that economy 
encompasses full-time providers who use designated capital (goods 
employed primarily for this purpose) or rely on their platform-economy 
work as their main source of income. This segment of the platform 
economy is large not only in terms of number of participants and 
transactions but also because it yields a massive part of the platforms’ 
revenue. Moreover, despite rhetoric emphasizing the “gig” aspect, 
platform firms, especially in the transportation sector, often encourage 
commercial use; for example, by incentivizing drivers to work over 40 
hours a week.23  
 
Despite data limitations regarding the types of consumers and providers 
in the platform economy, the data are clear about the coexistence of these 
two types of activities (increased excess-capacity use and conventional 
use without increased excess capacity) and their prominence. For 
example, data on short-term rental platforms consistently show how 
activities vary regarding the extent of underutilization by lessors. Most 
properties offered by Airbnb lessors capitalize on their genuinely 
underutilized assets, but a substantial minority use Airbnb to rent their 
properties commercially. A study conducted by the Penn State University 
School of Hospitality Management and funded by the American Hotel and 
Lodging Association examined activities by lessors who posted properties 
on Airbnb in fourteen large United States metropolitan areas, from 
October 2014 to September 2015.24 The study divided “hosts” (lessors) 
into three categories: those who offered an entire unit for a short time 
during the year, those who offered a unit for the entire year, and those who 
had two or more units on the platform. The results demonstrate that those 
who work with designated capital (property whose primary use is for 
                                                     
22 Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014). 
23 Uber Launches Power Driver Rewards to Compete with Lyft, RIDESHARE 
DASHBOARD, (Mar. 10, 2016), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2016/03/10/uber-launches-
power-driver-rewards-to-compete-with-lyft/; Brenton J Malin & Curry Chandler, Free to 
Work Anxiously: Splintering Precarity Among Drivers for Uber and Lyft, 10 COMMUN. 
CULT. CRIT. 382, 391-92 (2016).  
24 JOHN W. O’NEILL & YUXIA OUYANG, AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR 
MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB 
(2016), https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/ 
Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016.pdf. 
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short-term rentals), although the minority, are consistently present across 
all of the cities and are responsible for massive revenues for Airbnb. The 
study found that 2,772 full-time operators (those who made their unit or 
units available over 360 days a year) constitute 3.5% of the total lessors.25 
While this may seem like a small number, Airbnb revenue from these full-
time operators was immense: in the period studied, they yielded 
$347,479,616 for Airbnb, or 26% of Airbnb’s total revenue in those 
locations.26 Furthermore, the study found that lessors who rented two or 
more units for any amount of time constituted 16.1% of all operators.27 
Finally, mega-operators, defined by the study as hosts who rent more than 
three units (for any amount of time), constituted 6.5% of the hosts and 
yielded 24.6% of Airbnb’s revenue, or $328,299,944, in those cities 
during that period.28 Data on users in other cities confirm similar results.29  
 
For the transportation platforms, data do not exist on how many drivers 
monetize their underused private cars versus how many purchase a vehicle 
primarily for commercial rides. Nonetheless, several programs offered by 
platform transportation firms help drivers to access cars, which implies 
that drivers with designated vehicles are not a marginal occurrence. Uber, 
the largest platform transportation company, has programs enabling their 
drivers to rent, lease, or buy a car.30 Uber’s Xchange leasing program 
helps drivers with bad or no credit to lease a car,31 without mileage 
restriction, and includes the maintenance of the vehicle.32 Similarly, Lyft, 
Uber’s main competitor, maintains the Express Drive Rental Car 
Program, which assists its drivers in renting a car.33 The rental price 
depends on the number of hours the driver works for Lyft; the higher the 
number of hours worked, the cheaper the rental price.  
 
                                                     
25 Id. at Key Findings. 
26 Id. at Appendix: Data Tables, Jan. 2016 Report. 
27 Id. at National Trends. 
28 Id. 
29 See Erez Aloni, Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy, 39 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 315, 324 (2017).  
30 See Vehicle Solutions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/vehicle-solutions/. 
31 See Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, Inside Uber’s Auto-Lease Machine, 
Where Almost Anyone Can Get a Car, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/inside-uber-s-auto-lease-
machine-where-almost-anyone-can-get-a-car. 
32 See Harry Campbell, Uber Vehicle Marketplace, RIDESHARE GUY, 
http://therideshareguy.com/uber-vehicle-marketplace/. 
33 See Express Drive Rental Car Program, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-
us/articles/218196557-Express-Drive-Rental-Car-Program-#cost. 
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In addition to using goods and capital, providers in the platform 
economy can either work full time or capitalize on their unused or 
underused hours. The distinction in this case is between workers who use 
their underutilized labor or skills by working for platforms part time—
selling labor-hours that are not available for their full-time job—and those 
who work full time for platform firms, just as incumbent employees do.  
 
Because most platforms do not provide accurate data about their 
providers, we rely on alternative surveys and studies to understand the 
work patterns in platforms. A study by the Requests for Startups group 
surveyed approximately 900 workers in 78 platform firms, including 
Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit.34 The authors examined the extent to 
which providers depend on the income they earn from platforms. If 
providers obtain most of their income from the platform, this is a good 
indication that the platform is their main source of employment. Relying 
partly on the platform income may indicate that it is a gig, a supplement 
to their main job. The survey found that 39% of workers rely on platform 
work for 25% of their income; 19% of workers surveyed earn 25–50% of 
their income from platform firms; 13% of workers, 50–75%; and 29% of 
workers, 75–100%.35 Thus, in terms of use of hours, the workers in the 
platform economy reflect a spectrum in which some work part time, as a 
gig, while almost 30% use platforms as their primary or sole source of 
income. Similarly, a survey of approximately 600 Uber drivers, conducted 
in December 2014, found that almost 40% of Uber drivers had no other 
job; roughly 30% of drivers had another full-time job; and the other 30% 
had another part-time job.36  
 
In conclusion, data on the use of capital and the number of hours 
invested in work reveal that activities in the platform economy lie on a 
spectrum ranging from small gigs leveraging surplus all the way to 
professional providers with designated capital who work commercially 
through the platforms. Next, I argue that these activities produce different 
                                                     
34 Jennifer Rossa & Anne Riley Moffat, The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEFS (June 
15, 2015), https://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/the-
workers-demographics; Alison Griswold, Young Twentysomethings May Have a Leg Up 
in the 1099 Economy, MONEYBOX (May 22, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/05/22/_1099_economy_workforce_report_
why_twentysomethings_may_have_a_leg_up.html.    
35 See Rossa & Moffat, supra note 34. 
36 Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for 
Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States, 10 (Princeton Univ. Indust. Relations 
Section, Working Paper No. 587, 2015) (describing a survey conducted by the Benenson 
Survey Group per Uber’s request).  
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levels of choice and negative externalities based on the level of increased 
excess capacity they leverage.   
III. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY AS A CHOICE-INCREASING 
MECHANISM 
Looking through the lens of pluralistic theory, we can see that one 
virtue of the platform economy is that it extends valuable choices to both 
consumers and providers. The platform economy, de facto, enables and 
simplifies a set of activities, a sphere of exchanges based on transforming 
idle capacity (goods, capital, or time) into work. By furnishing technology 
that is available to many and relatively user-friendly, the platforms reduce 
entry barriers (e.g., expenses) to excess-maximizing transactions and ease 
the participation of nonprofessional providers. While work in increased 
use of excess capacity existed long before the emergence of platforms, the 
platforms make exchanges based on surplus between nonprofessional 
providers easier and more efficient than before.   
  
For consumers, the platform economy creates another layer of market 
choice. Consumers have diverse needs, tastes, and preferences, and the 
platforms expand options for them. In a PwC survey, 86% of respondents 
familiar with the platforms agreed that they make life more affordable, 
and 83% agreed that they make life more convenient and efficient. This 
survey confirms that the platforms satisfy different needs and preferences 
for consumers.37  
 
Short-term rental platforms, for example, facilitate the option of staying 
in someone else’s permanent home for a short period. In making this 
alternative more easily available than it was before, this option appeals to 
consumers who care more about price, as short-term rentals are often 
cheaper than hotels. This opportunity is also attractive to travelers who 
prefer experiencing a destination from a local resident’s point of view. 
Conversely, other travelers may be more risk-averse and want to avoid 
any problem stemming from dealing with private individuals, or they 
prefer a hotel’s scenery or cleanliness, or they care less about cost. A 
similar distinction applies to the transportation platform firms: they offer 
another layer of choice to consumers. Some passengers prefer traditional 
taxis, perhaps because they do not like waiting for a ride; or they perceive 
taxis as safer; or they want to pay cash or do not have a smartphone. Yet, 
                                                     
37 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES:  THE SHARING 
ECONOMY 20 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-
media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf.  
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others favor the lower cost of the platform rides and the technological 
benefit of seeing where the driver is. It is not surprising, then, that in the 
PwC survey, 32% of respondents indicated that “more choice in the 
marketplace” is a strong selling point for the transportation platform 
firms.38 The bottom line is that, through excess-capacity enhancement, the 
platform economy provides more choice to consumers.  
  
For providers, the platform economy offers the opportunity to work in 
a flexible structure, in small gigs, to leverage unused time or skills as a 
means to earn supplementary income. In other words, by reducing entry 
barriers into industries that once required initial monetary investment as 
well as some professional knowledge, the platform economy allows 
nonprofessional players to maximize their underused skills, from driving 
to cooking, to make extra income. 
 
Flexible working hours are important to many workers across 
industries. Researchers at the McKinsey Global Institute examined the 
experience of freelancers in general (not only those working for 
platforms) and found that independent contractors emphasized the 
importance of flexibility and autonomy that this job framework offers.39 
They elaborate, “Many earners strongly prefer the autonomy and 
flexibility of independent work. They value being their own boss, setting 
their own hours to some extent, and focusing on work that interests them 
. . . . The Uber driver can fit his hours around a class schedule or family 
priorities.”40 With regard to workers in the platform economy, they found 
that, in the United States, 87% of those workers chose this working pattern 
rather than resorting to it as a necessity (i.e., because they could not find 
a different type of job). Data provided by Uber indicate that its drivers 
appreciate the flexibility of their work. When drivers were asked how they 
decide when to work, 40% answered that it depends on what else is on 
their schedule.41 Thus, working as a freelancer in the platform economy 
may increase choice for workers. Therefore, in line with pluralistic theory 
that individuals put different values on different aspects of life, the 
                                                     
38 Id.  
39 JAMES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., INDEPENDENT WORK:  CHOICE, 
NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 61 (2016), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and
%20Growth/Independent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20
economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy-Full-report.ashx. 
40 Id. at 45. 
41 Amy Levin, The Driver Roadmap:  Where Uber Driver-Partners Have Been, 
and Where They’re Going, BENENSON STRATEGY GRP. 3 (2014), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf. 
Pluralism and Regulatory Response  4/14/2018  8:47 AM 
 
 
platform economy boosts consumer and provider choice.   
 
IV. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY IS ALSO A CHOICE-
DECREASING MECHANISM 
The platform economy can also reduce alternatives for consumers and 
providers. Because of the competition posed by the platforms’ suppliers, 
some conventional services that are not platform-based are at risk of 
becoming scarcer. The threat to traditional services is especially imminent 
when platforms sanction commercial work (not using excess capacity). In 
that case, and without regulation that protects incumbents from unfair 
competition, traditional (non-platform–enabled) providers may not 
withstand the competition; we can already see reduction in availability of 
traditional services.  
 
For instance, transportation platforms’ entry into the market has led to 
a considerable decline in the number of taxi rides. One city that has 
experienced a dramatic change in the availability of taxis is Los Angeles. 
A report by the UCLA Labor Center found that between 2013 and 2014, 
taxi ridership dropped by 18%, a total of 1.4 million fewer trips than in 
the previous year.42 This number is likely larger currently because, at the 
time of the study, platform-operated vehicles were not allowed to pick up 
passengers from LAX airport, a location that constituted a large source of 
taxi rides—while now they can. Los Angeles’s experience is typical of 
many U.S. cities.43 The resulting financial struggles have forced cab 
companies to fire workers, file for bankruptcy, and even close entirely, 
making taxi services less available to the general public in some regions.44  
 
The decreased availability of traditional taxis is detrimental to 
consumers who feel less safe or are more likely to encounter 
discrimination in obtaining services, particularly individuals from 
                                                     
42 Saba Waheed, et al., Ridesharing or Ridestealing?  Changes in Taxi Ridership 
and Revenue in Los Angeles 2009–2014, UCLA LABOR CTR. (2015), 
http://www.labor.ucla.edu/downloads/policy-brief-ridesharing-or-ridestealing/. 
43 Aloni, supra note 29, at 331 (describing similar experience in Seattle and 
Arlington).  
44 In 2016, San Francisco’s biggest taxi company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
See In re Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., No. 3:16-bk-30063 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016); 
see also Kate Rogers, Uber, Lyft Put Pressure on Taxi Companies, CNBC (Jan. 26, 
2016, 1:10 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/26/uber-lyft-put-pressure-on-taxi-
companies.html.   
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minority groups. For instance, a recent study documented how African 
Americans had a harder time obtaining Uber and Lyft rides compared to 
their white counterparts.45 This study found that in Seattle, African-
American passengers had to wait longer before booking a ride via Uber, 
up to 35% longer than white passengers. In Boston, the study used 
passengers with African-American–sounding names and found that Uber 
drivers cancelled rides more than twice as frequently as they cancelled 
rides for passengers with white-sounding names. Certainly, racial 
discrimination by traditional taxis is a familiar, well-established fact and 
occurs on a regular basis.46 However, while a host of federal and state laws 
discourage racial discrimination by traditional taxis,47 the applicability of 
these laws to the platform-based rides, and to the firms themselves, is a 
more contested question.48 
 
People with disabilities constitute another group that has been harmed 
by the disappearance or reduction of traditional taxi services. Stories 
abound of incidents in which Uber drivers refused to take individuals with 
disabilities, either because they had service animals or used a 
wheelchair.49 Indeed, the National Federation of the Blind of California 
filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of blind Uber customers, arguing that 
Uber has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act; Uber replied that 
the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to them.50 While Uber 
and Lyft have recently established programs to accommodate the needs of 
passengers who rely on wheelchairs, some aver that these services are 
rarely available.51 
 
Finally, people who feel more vulnerable may believe that they are 
                                                     
45 See Yanbo Ge, et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation 
Network Companies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22776, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.  
46 See, e.g., Service Denied: Responding to Taxicab Discrimination in the District 
of Columbia i, THE EQUAL RIGHTS CTR. (2003), https://equalrightscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/taxicab_report.pdf 
47 Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. 
L.J. 1271, 1297-98 (2017).   
48 See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 85, 95 (2015).  
49 See Jason Marker, Wheelchair Using Passenger Films Uber Driver Refusing to 
Pick Him Up, AUTO BLOG http://www.autoblog.com/2017/01/10/wheelchair-using-
passenger-films-uber-driver-refusing-to-pick-hi/. 
50 See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of California v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 
1073, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
51 See Heather Kelly, Uber’s Services for the Disabled Lack Actual Cars, CNN, 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/02/technology/uber-access/. 
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safer taking taxis than using platform-enabled rides. Even though there is 
no definitive evidence that taxis are safer than platform-facilitated rides 
or that many people perceive taxis as safer, multiple publicized reports in 
which platform drivers attacked, harassed, or refused to pick up minorities 
may deter some from choosing this option.52 The firms’ refusal to 
fingerprint their drivers, as taxi companies do, may bolster this 
hesitation.53 The bottom line is that, for some people, the availability of 
traditional taxis is still essential because the alternative is viewed as riskier 
or because it is harder for them to get it. 
 
In a similar fashion, short-term rental platforms threaten the existence 
of valuable options in traditional accommodations, such as lower-end 
hotels. Competition with the short-term rental platforms has endangered 
less expensive hotels because the higher-end hotels are more likely than 
platforms to attract businesspeople and wealthier tourists. A recent study 
concluded that Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry in Texas is unevenly 
distributed because Airbnb threatens mostly lower-end hotels, making 
them most vulnerable to economic harm.54 The declining options to stay 
in such hotels can have the most serious impact on those who cannot 
afford the more luxurious accommodation options or those who find it 
harder to book a room through the short-term housing platforms. The 
option of traditional hotels may be important for those who are not savvy 
with technology and thus cannot, or do not want to, use platforms. Other 
individuals may find that booking a room via a platform is more difficult 
due to discrimination. Researchers recently found that users with names 
perceived to be distinctively African American were 16% less likely to 
succeed in booking a stay than were users with identical profiles but who 
                                                     
52 See Raymond Rizzo, Uber Driver James Henneberg is “Bothered” by the 
“Transgender Thing”; Refuses to be Paired with Gay Couple in Future; Admits to 
Lying, E. NASHVILLE NEWS (Jan. 7, 2017), http://eastnashville.news/2017/01/uber-driver-
james-henneberg-is-bothered-by-the-transgender-thing-refuses-to-be-paired-with-gay-
couple-in-future-admits-to-lying/; Mary Emily O’Hara, Lyft Driver Accused of 
Threatening Activist Monica Jones in Transphobic Post, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 28, 
2016), http://www.dailydot.com/irl/lyft-driver-monica-jones-location-facebook/. 
53 See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Uber CEO explains why he thinks fingerprinting 
drivers is ‘unjust,’ CNNMONEY (June 24, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/23/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-ges-
fingerprinting/index.html. 
54 See Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing 
Economy:  Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30 (Boston U. Sch. 
Mgmt. Research, Working Paper No. 2013-16, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898. 
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had names considered to be distinctively white.55  
 
Finally, consumers may find that the long-term residential rental 
options in their own cities are decreasing as more owners convert long-
term rental units to short-term rentals. This phenomenon of people who 
invest in apartments to transform them short-term rentals has become 
widespread, as evidenced, inter alia, by websites that advise potential 
buyers on the cities in which this practice is most profitable.56 
Communities and local governments have responded with calls for 
regulations that restrain this phenomenon. Without expanding too much 
on this, the rise of commercial short-term rentals has exacerbated the 
shortage of rentals in many popular metropolitan areas and further 
increased rental prices. Thus, while consumers enjoy more choice in 
finding vacation rentals, they may face a problem securing long-term 
rentals in their hometown.  
   
Importantly, the platform economy can also reduce options for workers 
by decreasing the number of full-time, protected employment 
opportunities. Workers in the platform economy are not classified 
“employees”; rather, their status is “independent contractor,” regardless 
of the time or frequency they work for platform firms or the control the 
firms retain over them.57 The different designation matters because the 
status of “employee” guarantees various employment protections, such as 
reimbursement of work-related expenses, overtime payment, employer 
contributions to unemployment insurance, and a minimum wage.58 
Indeed, one study surveyed providers in the platform economy and found 
that “41 percent say they prefer the security and benefits of working for a 
traditional company even if it might mean less flexibility.”59 Hence, 
another tradeoff of the platform economy: increased flexible work 
opportunities versus decreased availability of traditional employment.  
 
                                                     
55 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination 
in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 16-069, 2016), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-
069_5c3b2b36-d9f8-4b38-9639-2175aaf9ebc9.pdf. 
56 https://www.airdna.co/about (“Airdna provides data and analytics to vacation 
rental entrepreneurs and investors.”).  
57 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in 
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673, 1684-88 (2016). 
58 See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015).   
59 See Press Release, Penn Schoen Berland, Forty-Five Million Americans Say 
They Have Worked in the On-Demand Economy, While 86.5 Million Have Used It, 
According to New Survey (Jan. 6, 2016), http://psbresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/On-Demand-Economy-Release.pdf. 
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In conclusion, the platform economy simultaneously increases and 
decreases options. Below, I examine what pluralistic theory teaches about 
this composition of choice in the market.      
 
V.  ENLISTING THE PRINCIPLES OF PLURALISM TO GUIDE 
THE REGULATION OF THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 
The platform economy enables activities that are different in their 
utilization of excess capacity; and based on their location on the spectrum 
of use, the exchanges contribute differently to the increase or the decrease 
in choice. Pluralism prescribes that the state support the extension of 
choice, which means actively endorsing the platform economy. But 
support does not mean an invitation to embrace a deregulation regime. 
The opposite is true: a truly pluralistic structure safeguards providers, 
consumers, and traditional options from the negative externalities that 
commercial-activity platforms produce. As Raz clarifies, a 
nonintervention approach “would undermine the chances of survival of 
many cherished aspects of our culture.”60 In our case, these “cherished 
aspects” are the conventional services that may disappear as a result of 
some businesses competing under different rules, while providing 
virtually the same products and services.  
  
Therefore, the first principle flowing from pluralism involves capturing 
the distinction between activity through increased use of excess capacity 
and work through activity not based on increased use. Specifically, 
lawmakers should craft regulations that distinguish between activities 
based on their location along the spectrum of use of increased excess 
capacity. Regulations should prevent incumbent-like providers from 
passing as increased-excess providers as a means to evade laws governing 
traditional sectors.  
 
Lawmakers can distinguish between the levels of use of increased 
excess capacity by examining two factors together: the frequency of 
supply and the infrastructure used for the transaction. The frequency 
denotes the number of transactions the provider is involved in within a 
defined period. The more frequently the supplier provides the goods or 
services, the more likely that she is not working in increased excess 
capacity. The other distinguishing factor is infrastructure: whether the 
goods or real property is primarily designated for a commercial purpose 
or only intermittently converted for such use. For instance, in the 
                                                     
60 Raz, supra note 2, at 162.  
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platform-transportation sector, some municipalities have debated whether 
to allow drivers to use their “personal vehicle” rather than a designated or 
rental car.61 In the short-term rental market, some municipalities have 
limited the number of nights that residents can lease their properties for 
short-term stays. The assumption is that a small number of transactions 
signals providers who leverage their surplus space, while those who 
exceed this threshold operate commercially. In San Francisco, for 
example, the threshold is 90 days a year.62 
  
Pluralistic principles would also have the state treat each legal regime 
differently according to the values the regime promotes. For activities of 
increased use, lawmakers should endorse that innovation and its results 
by allowing people to leverage their goods, time, and skills. Thus, 
lawmakers are justified in treating each category differently. Lawmakers 
should, therefore, create two (or more) different regulatory regimes based 
on a spectrum of excess-capacity use. Activities based on increased excess 
capacity should be regulated lightly and tailored to casual, 
nonprofessional providers. Traditional work done through platforms 
should be governed by the same rules as those for incumbents unless a 
significant reason justifies a departure from such regulations.  
 
For some types of critical matters, such as safety regulations, the 
distinctions between levels of increased excess capacity may not matter. 
In such matters, policymakers can reasonably insist that there is no 
difference between work in increased excess capacity and other work. A 
part-time driver can cause the same harm as one who drives regularly if 
she drives an unsafe vehicle or without adequate insurance. Thus, 
lawmakers should impose safety requirements—criminal-background 
checks, vehicle inspections, insurance coverage—in a way that assures 
public safety and reasonable allocation of risk. More generally, it means 
that activities in increased use of excess capacity will be subject to 
regulation that advances safety and prevents market failures. But the 
regulations of such activities, to the extent possible, should be designed in 
                                                     
61 See, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to Passenger 
Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enabled Transp. Servs. (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 27, 
2012), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M040/K862/40862944.pdf;  Car
olyn Said, Uber, Lyft may face new rules in California, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE 
(April 5, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-may-face-new-
rules-in-California-7230320.php (reporting that “The PUC is poised to allow drivers to 
use leased vehicles, but only if the lease is for more than four months.”).  
62 See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(A) (2016). 
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a fashion that minimizes obstacles for casual suppliers.   
 
Except for core issues as safety, however, the regulations of activities 
in increased use of excess capacity should differ from those imposed on 
traditional transactions (whether or not operated through platforms). Hotel 
tax provides an interesting test case on this point. San Francisco, like 
several other municipalities, created a new set of rules governing short-
term rentals; it imposes on each transaction an occupancy tax (collected 
by Airbnb) equivalent to that levied on hotels.63 However, regulations 
may reasonably set different tax rates for various transactions, based on 
the level of use of excess capacity, since transactions may vary in the type 
of visitors they attract and in their use of municipalities’ infrastructures. 
Hotels are more likely to draw businesspeople who use amenities such as 
convention centers or performing-arts centers. Conversely, travelers who 
turn to platforms to experience a location from a resident’s perspective 
may be less likely to use some of these infrastructures. Airbnb units 
offered by casual users may also be located in areas that are less touristic 
in nature; thus, these regions receive less revenue from hotel tax. As 
renting rooms or units on a short-term basis provides more business for 
these less-visited locations, lawmakers can incentivize people to visit 
these areas. Thus, unlike the path taken so far by most cities that collect 
hotel tax on short-term rentals by platforms, pluralistic principles justify 
creating a different tax rate for transactions based on casual use. Of 
course, such casual exchanges may use some services that are funded by 
hotel taxes; thus, a municipality can offer these providers a reduced tax 
rate (rather than cutting it altogether). Alternatively, municipalities can 
impose a tax equal to the regular hotel tax on short-term rentals located in 
the central tourist zones, while creating a reduced tax rate for short-term 
rentals in other zones. This should not create extra administrative burdens 
or confusion because, in regulated regimes, lessors typically register their 
units; the city can inform them of their hotel-tax rate at the time of 
registration. 
 
In a similar vein, in employment situations, pluralistic principles 
suggest that lawmakers should treat full-time workers in the platform 
economy differently than they treat casual providers in that economy. The 
former are not substantially different from traditional employees. The 
                                                     
63 See Transient Occupancy Tax (TOT) Frequently Asked Questions for Hosts, 
Website Companies and Merchants of Record, OFFICE OF THE TREASURER & TAX 
COLLECTOR, CITY & CNTY. OF S.F., 
http://sftreasurer.org/tot_host_website_merchant_faq#1. 
Pluralism and regulatory response (Autosaved) 4/14/2018  8:47 AM 
2018] Pluralism and Regulatory Response   
 
platforms exert a level of control over these workers that is quite similar 
to employers’ control over traditional employees.64 For instance, in the 
transportation arena, Lyft and Uber exert more control over workers who 
work voluminous hours by creating various programs that incentivize 
their drivers to provide more hours a week.65 The flexibility and autonomy 
of the “independent contractor” framework is diminished once the driver 
is nudged to refuse riders. These drivers’ incomes also depend heavily on 
the platform employer. Thus, when it comes to providers in the platform 
economy who may or may not be not using their increased excess capacity 
but, in any case, are essentially working full time (or nearly so) for an 
employer, they should be recognized as traditional employees for the 
purpose of benefits and protections. Indeed, some courts around the world 
have determined that Uber drivers should be classified as employees.66 
  
Further, casual workers (those truly leveraging their excess capacity) 
should receive basic protections, as well. Pluralism calls for innovation 
and a variety of options. While infrequent providers are more akin to 
freelancers, essential norms and safeguards, such as minimum wage and 
overtime pay, should still apply to them. A few commentators have 
proposed that lawmakers create a special category, an intermediate level 
between employee and independent contractor, that includes basic 
employment protections and benefits.67 So far, even jurisdictions that have 
regulated transportation platforms have not addressed the employment 
status of drivers. This omission leaves the final decision about 
employment status to the courts, which are limited in what they can do. 
Courts can decide whether workers are classified as employees or 
independent contractors but cannot create an intermediate status that 
incorporates the distinction between those who work in increased use of 
excess capacity and those who do not. 
 
In addition to creating new content, a regulatory regime designed to 
                                                     
64 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 57, at 1687.  
65 See, e.g., Power Driver Bonus, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-
us/articles/214586477-Power-Driver-Bonus. 
66 See, e.g., Reserved Judgment of the Employment Tribunal at 1, Aslam v. Uber 
BV [2016] IRLR 4 (U.K. Empl. Trib.) (No. 2202551/2015), (ruling that Uber drivers are 
“employed” as “workers” and not self-employed). 
67 See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, BROOKINGS INST., A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK:  THE “INDEPENDENT 
WORKER” 2 (2015), www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_ 
twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf; SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, RIGHTS ON DEMAND:  ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER 
SECURITY IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 10 (2015), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-Demand-Report.pdf. 
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foster increased excess-capacity transactions must be clear and easy to 
follow and ought to impose minimal administrative burdens. The rules 
should be crafted with awareness that casual providers are micro-earners 
rather than sophisticated players with resources to hire legal counsel or 
capacity to follow complex regulations. Such design would also prevent 
the lost benefits that stem from evasion of the law when markets operate 
underground, thus reducing revenue from tax collection and putting 
workers and customers at risk.  
 
In summary, pluralistic principles would separate transactions based on 
where they fall on the spectrum of use of increased excess capacity. They 
support the creation of a regime that boosts activities in monetizing idle 
capacity and differentiates them from exchanges that pose as using 
increased excess capacity but are actually akin to conventional 
transactions.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The platform economy introduces a promise and a risk. Its promise lies 
in facilitating transactions that are based on the use of increased excess 
capacity. In so doing, it offers another layer of choice and makes it more 
possible for people to be the authors of their own lives. When the platform 
economy functions in this way, pluralistic principles call for letting these 
activities flourish, with some regulation to ensure no harm to involved or 
third parties. But the platforms too often turn a blind eye to, or encourage, 
conventional commercial-work-in-disguise that is not grounded in 
leveraging surplus capacity. In such cases, choice for consumers, workers, 
and society at large can be reduced. Then, pluralistic principles call for 
state intervention—through regulation—to prevent multiple harms and to 
preserve valuable choice.    
 
 
